Abstract: This paper is a study of how the people at the centre of the violent conflict in Thailand's southern border provinces have been represented, with particular reference to the period from the Second World War to the present. It provides a brief historical background to a number of discourses of identity regarding the people in the region. It focuses on the struggle between competing discourses of Thai national identity, Malay ethnic identity, Muslim identity, and a more localized identity centred on the memory of the former sultanate of Patani and its associated linguistic and cultural traditions.
In January 2004, a centuries-old conflict in Thailand's southern border provinces broke out once again. Over 2,000 people have been killed, the number of attacks has been increasing and the nature of the violence is intensifying. While in the past the main targets of militants were military and security officials, the current violence has targeted teachers, government officials, religious leaders and villagers -both Buddhist and Muslim -tourists, even women and children. Despite an escalation in the violence, it is still unclear who is leading the insurgency and what their political demands are. At present, it is South East Asia's most violent insurgency. It would appear, then, to be the simplest of questions: who are the people at the centre of the violent conflict in Thailand's 'three southern provinces '? 2 Judging by the coverage of the issue by the Thai and international media, the statements by the Thai and Malaysian governments, and the work of a large number of academics, particularly those in the field of security studies whose opinions have been eagerly sought, most appear to have concluded: 'Muslims'. The Thai government will often add an adjective to this collective name to affirm this group's nationality: 'Thai Muslims' (or less correctly, though a term still widely used, 'Thai Islam'). The perception of the conflict as being religious in nature is particularly strong in Thailand. One has only to look at the Thai media coverage of the violence since early 2004, the regular seminars organized to promote interreligious understanding, concerns expressed to the Thai authorities by the Malaysian government about the 'Muslims of southern Thailand', and visits to Thailand in 2005 by representatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as well as the heads of Indonesia's two major religious organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Merely by the use of these religious labels to represent the actors involved in conflict, despite the Thai government's attempts to characterize the conflict as not a religious one, it is difficult for the Thai public to imagine it otherwise. Since the conflict has tended to be viewed in Thailand predominantly in religious terms, it is inevitable that the solutions that are offered tend to be based on religious considerations. 3 Yet if the conflict were religious, it would raise the question as to why hundreds of thousands of 'Thai Muslims' residing outside the three southern provinces where the violence has been concentrated have not shown greater solidarity with their co-religionists in their struggle with the Thai state. 4 Why then is this conflict consistently represented today using religious terminology?
This paper is an attempt to present a brief historical overview of how the people in the southern border region have been represented. It will give particular attention to the struggle between competing discourses of Thai national identity, pan-Malay ethnic identity, Muslim identity, and a more localized 'Patani Malay' identity centred on the memory of the former sultanate of Patani and its associated linguistic and cultural elements.
Pre-nationalist discourses of identity
If one examines the chronicles and other documentary evidence produced by the Thai court in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries about the Patani sultanate, as well as the Thai kingdom's other Malay dependencies such as Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, it is striking that there is, in fact, relatively little reference to the cultural identity of the peoples of the region. The narrative is dominated by the king and his administrative officials and their counterparts in the vassal states. However, when the people or the region are distinguished in cultural terms, the word that is used most frequently is khaek, and less commonly khaek melayu or melayu.
5 Khaek is a more complex term than is often understood. In Thai, the common literal meaning is 'guest'. Sathian argues that it derives from a Hokkien word meaning the same. 6 But the term khaek has also long been used by Thai officials as well as in popular discourse to refer to such diverse peoples as Malays, people from the Indian subcontinent (of whatever provided by the Islamic Committee Office of Thailand, Gilquin quotes extraordinarily high figures of 7,391,235 for the country as a whole and 3,454,300 for Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat combined; Michel Gilquin (2005) It seems then that for the Thais, the terms melayu or khaek already signified people of a different religion.
As the region is brought under closer control of the Thai court in the latter part of the reign of King Chulalongkorn, we see the first appearance of the idea of 'Thai-ification' as a tool of government. Among the recommendations that Prince Damrong, Head of the Ministry of the Interior, made in a report to the King in 1896 was that the government should attempt to 'cultivate' local administrators who were 'Thai both 7 On the use of the term khaek by the Thai court in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Davisakd Puaksom (2003) in mind and manners '. 9 Yet even after the abolition of the Patani sultanate, the exile and imprisonment of its last sultan, Abdulkadir Kamaruddin, and the definitive absorption of the territories of the former sultanate into the Thai state under the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty, the Thai court could still refer to the region's inhabitants as 'Malay'. According to Kobkua, the King aimed eventually to achieve a situation in which 'even though they are Malays and of a different faith . . . [they] are Thais in sentiment and outlook just as any other Thai. . .' 10 Thus it seemed possible then, still under the Absolute Monarchy, for the Thai government to recognize dual identities within one state, 'Thai' and 'Malay' (or khaek).
As for the Patani historiographical tradition, the Patani chronicle known as Hikayat Patani, the most important source for subsequent Malay historiography about Patani's early history, refers only rarely to 'Malay'.
11 It is essentially a narrative about Patani's rajas and court officials, and its relations with Ayuthaya and the other Malay sultanates of the peninsula, not about a 'people'. While Islam is certainly a defining feature of the chronicle -the conversion of the raja to Islam is a major event at the beginning of the chronicle -as in the Thai chronicles referred to above, there is very little reference to 'Muslims'. The Hikayat Patani is also noteworthy for the apparent lack of animosity its author displays towards Siam, and the close, if not always smooth, relations between Ayuthaya and Patani. In an early section, King Mudhaffar Syah deliberates with his officials regarding a proposed visit to Ayudhya: 'What would you say if We went to Ayudhya, for the king is no stranger to Us, and after all, two countries are better than one'. Since the era of de-colonization and the formation of nation-states following the Second World War, we see the emergence of the 'Patani Malays' as a subject of political and scholarly discourse. It is remarkable how little reference there is to their religious identity. How then have the subjects of the conflict been transformed from 'Malays' into 'Muslims'? The answer can be found partly in the appearance of three new, though separate, discourses that have impacted upon the identity of the inhabitants of the former Patani sultanate.
First, since the era of de-colonization and the rise of Malay nationalism in British Malaya, the Thai government has actively sought to avoid references to the Malay ethnic identity of the subjects of the region. It feared that with the new, post-colonial logic of nation-based states, recognition of the people of the region as 'Malay' would give credibility to demands for a separate Malay state, either based on the territories of the old Malay sultanate of Patani, or through union with the other Malay states of British Malaya, which were now preparing for independence from Britain. In much the same way and for the same reasons, the Lao identity of the inhabitants of the north-east was officially erased as the Thai state created a new name by which they would be formally known, 'Isan'. Similarly, the Chinese were forced to declare their allegiance to the Thai state through a name change, by abandoning their Chinese names and replacing them with Thai ones. The State Cultural Directives (ratthaniyom) of the first Phibun 20 Davisakd, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
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In Malay, Pertubuhan Persatuan Pembebasan Patani (PPPP).
government banned official references to ethnic identity.
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Under the assimilationist policies of national integration that began in Thailand during the Phibun period and held sway through to the 1990s, Malay ethnic identity as expressed in terms of language, dress, education, history and custom was consistently discouraged by the state.
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The government has attempted to replace it with a religious label, 'Thai Muslims' or 'Thai Islam', in the hope that this linguistic change would contribute to the overall goal of assimilation. Thus for the Thai government, the only possible identity officially acceptable for the former 'Patani Malays' within the Thai nation-state since the Phibun era has been as 'Thai Muslims'.
Islamization in Malaysia
But discourses of Thai national identity and the government's programme of cultural assimilation are only part of the answer. Another is the politicization of Islam amongst the Malays in neighbouring Malaysia. Although this process first becomes clearly visible in the 1970s, its seeds were sown with the establishment of the state of Malaysia and the legal definition of Malayness. One of the components of Malay identity as defined by the Malaysian Constitution was 'a person who professes the religion of Islam'.
24 Following Malaysia's independence in 1957, therefore, to be a Malay -and thereby eligible for the special privileges accorded to 'Malays' -legally one must be a Muslim.
Yet The Thai education system played a crucial role in this policy of assimilation. A colleague from Narathiwat province once told me of his experience as a student in a Thai government school in Narathiwat, where in place of the legends of Malay cultural heroes such as Hang Tuah he had learnt about while in the pondok, he was obliged to read Sang Thong and other classics of the Thai literary canon.
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Article 60 of the Malaysian Constitution defines 'Malay' as follows: '"Malay" means a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and -was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or is the issue of such a person. ' (Virginia Matheson Hooker (2004) attention. The bulk of the book concentrates on Malay cultural traits that were supposedly responsible for the 'dilemma' in which, according to Mahathir, the Malays now found themselves.
The insecurity of the Malays, barely a majority 'in their own land' and economically disadvantaged compared with the Chinese and Indians, received violent expression in the deadly 1969 race riots in which hundreds were killed in clashes between Malays and Chinese. The government later enacted the New Economic Policy, which aimed at raising the socioeconomic status of Malays vis-à-vis the other races through a systematic affirmative action policy directed towards the Malays. Meanwhile student activism in Malaysia began to take on an Islamic face. The most prominent organization was ABIM, the Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement, led by the charismatic student, Anwar Ibrahim. The movement called for an end to the rural poverty and neglect of the Malays, and an enhanced role for Islam in Malay society and politics. Anwar's radicalism led to his arrest and detention under the ISA in 1974-75.
On becoming Prime Minister in 1981, Mahathir began to implement his own policy of Islamization, despite his credentials as secular nationalist odernizer. A year later, he co-opted Anwar into the government. Between them a policy emerged that viewed Islam as the answer to 'social ills' -corruption, laziness, materialism, drug addiction, promiscuity, incest, child abuse -which appeared to be more prevalent among the Malays than the other ethnic groups, and which were blamed on the government's policy of rapid economic development. 25 It is from this era that the government begins to promote Islam as a solution to these problems and to exhort Malays to obey and live out the teachings of Islam. Islamic discourse in Malaysia, therefore, became dominated by the government, a task that was made easier by its stranglehold on political power due to the racialized nature of Malaysian politics and its control of the mass media. Ironically, therefore, the two key figures in the Islamization of Malay society were politicians, Mahathir and Anwar, rather than trained Islamic scholars. Indeed, it is interesting that neither Mahathir nor Anwar, the authors of the government's Islamization campaign, had had any solid Islamic education, but rather received their schooling in the Western educational tradition. Mahathir graduated in medicine from Singapore's King Edward VII Medical College, while Anwar attended the 25 Hooker, supra note 24, at pp 153-156. However, for Mahathir, Islam also fulfilled another important function. It provided a useful alternative ideological basis for a Malaysian critique of Western 'imperialism' and neo-colonialism, in place of the Marxist conceptual framework and language that was common to anticolonial movements and sentiment in most newly independent Third World countries, and to which Mahathir was vehemently opposed. Mahathir later emerged as a leading Third World critic of the West, using a mixture of anticolonial rhetoric -which appealed to post-colonial societies globally -and called for a revival of Islamic values -which appealed to Muslim countries in particular. This critique only increased in appeal after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and especially following the end of the Cold War.
At the same time, besides the official UMNO brand of Islam developed by Mahathir and Anwar and sponsored by the central government apparatus, an alternative Malay political party and UMNO's main rival for the Malay vote, the Parti Islam se Malaysia, or PAS, was also promoting its own brand of Islam. Significantly, this party's heartland was in Kelantan, which is geographically and linguistically, not to mention historically, closely related to the Patani Malays. This link is important. Close ties between the two peoples go back at least as far as the late seventeenth century when, following the fall of the Kota Maligai dynasty, Patani came under the rule of rajas descended from the Kelantanese dynasty. In 1842, following a decade of revolt and turmoil in Siam's Malay dependencies, the Thai rulers themselves installed a member of the Kelantanese dynastic line as raja of Patani; and following his imprisonment in Phitsanulok after the abolition of the Patani sultanate in the early twentieth century, the former sultan Abdulkadir Kamarrudin went into exile in Kelantan, where he died. Today the border with Kelantan is marked by the Kolok River, and people can (1) faith and piety in Allah; (2) just and trustworthy government; (3) freedom and independence to the people; (4) mastery of knowledge; (5) balanced and comprehensive economic development; (6) good quality of life for all; (7) protection of the rights of minority groups and women; (8) cultural and moral integrity; (9) protection of the environment; (10) strong defence policy. If one changed just one word -'Allah' to 'God' -then these 10 principles could be the wish list for virtually any modernizing country in the world, no matter what the religion of its citizens.
cross the river and the border with relative ease. Close kinship ties exist between the peoples on both sides of the border, and many PAS leaders in Kelantan have relatives there.
31 Separatist organizations have long enjoyed close links with Kelantan.
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Farish Noor has discussed the changes in PAS's political ideology and the rise of the party 'from the ashes' under the presidency of Yusof Rawa in the 1980s. 33 From the Party's roots in anticolonialism, Malay ethno-nationalism and even leftism, Yusof Rawa began a major transformation of its ideology by promoting what is now popularly called an 'Islamist' agenda. Secular 'ethno-nationalism' (Arabic: asabiyyah) came under severe criticism as having demonstrably failed the Muslim world in the decades following de-colonization. It was said to be un-Islamic, a product not of a primordial essence, but a remnant of colonialism that had divided the umma. Ethno-nationalism should thus be seen as a throwback to the age of jahiliyyah (ignorance) before the coming of Islam. In one speech, he argued:
'The Malay people have become backward thanks to the practice of asabiyyah which is oppressive and corrupt. Efforts to help the Malays will fail because of the corruption and oppression (that accompanies this form of communitarian politics), and so such corruption must be resisted and destroyed for good. This tyrannical form of asabiyyah is the root cause of the backwardness and suffering of the people.' 34 He argued that the Party's previous adoption of 'forms of communitarian politics had merely led to divisions within the Muslim ummah and were the cause of the Islamic Party's lack of direction during the 1970s'.
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PAS's rejection of ethnic politics from the 1980s thus clearly distinguished PAS's political ideology from the Malay nationalism of the ruling UMNO party. Yusoff Rawa's presidency also saw the rise of the ulama to positions of power in the Party apparatus, giving them a much more prominent role in the Party than ever before. Under PAS, which has been in power since 1959 for all but nine years, Malay society in Kelantan has been Islamized to a greater extent than ever before. Shadow-play, once one of the traditional icons of Malay culture throughout the Malay world, has almost disappeared, discouraged by the religious authorities on the grounds that it is unIslamic. The rare performances that do take place, once an official permit has been obtained from the government, have been cleansed of their Hindu-Buddhist symbolism. Yet as Noor argues, PAS's policies of Islamization could not have been possible without UMNO's statesponsored Islamization programme.
37 He describes the situation as an 'Islamization Race' between UMNO and PAS, which has reduced the 'discursive space' for other conceptions of Malaysian society and politics, especially in the Malay Muslim community. 38 The debate about the implementation of shariah, and especially PAS's professed desire to bring in hudud penal law, can thus be seen in this context of trying to 'out-Islamize' its rival, UMNO. 
'De-culturalization' of Islam in southern Thailand
Between the Thai policy of assimilation and Malaysian programmes of Islamization across the border, one might well ask to what extent a Patani Malay identity still exists among the locals of the 'three southern provinces'. There are few empirical data on which to base an answer to this important question. In fact, the very problem of the lack of primary data from the region due to the ongoing violence is a crucial methodological obstacle hindering a better understanding of what is actually happening in lower southern Thailand. 43 Anecdotally, it is said that fluency in the Patani Malay (or Yawi) dialect among the young has decreased compared with a generation ago, and that competence in Thai has increased. Students from the southern border provinces studying at Walailak University where I teach will usually affirm (out of habit?) their 'Thainess'. While most are fluent in Thai, their Yawi accents are quite noticeable and they will speak in dialect to friends from the same region. Some anthropological work suggests that Muslim youths from the Thai border provinces working in Malaysia will talk to each other in Thai.
44 A half-century of assimilationist policies carried out by the Thai government must surely have had some effect. Yet many people from the region travel to Malaysia and some to Indonesia for educational and employment purposes, which exposes them to an alternative 'Malay' cultural milieu. Another cultural influence in the region that has increased is Arabic, as students return from their studies in the Middle East, or as a result of funding provided by Arab states for religious and educational purposes. 45 Some female Muslim students at Islamic colleges in the southern border provinces have adopted the full veil that covers the whole face apart from the eyes, a style of dress that 43 The difficulty is manifold: the uncertain security situation; fear on the part of the locals of the consequences of divulging information to unknown outsiders, and the lack of familiarity with the local dialect and culture on the part of most researchers. Given such methodological obstacles, one would wish for more humility on the part of many academics in their representations of the situation in the south. 44 Mala Rajoo Sathian and Saroja Doraraijoo (2002), 'Being melayu the Thai way: perceiving the Thai-Malay border from a people's perspective', paper presented at the 9 th International Thai Studies Conference, 9-12 June, Nakhon Phanom.
45
Here we should be just as careful not to essentialize a monolithic, unchanging 'Arabic' culture that is sometimes inherent in critiques of the so-called 'Arabization' of South East Asian Islam.
was previously unknown in the local Malay culture. The influence of so-called 'Wahabi' religious orthodoxy, for example, in the performance of daily prayers, has in some cases clashed with 'traditional Malay' religious practices. It has split some communities, and in some cases has led to people praying in separate congregations.
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Numerous studies point to social problems prevalent among the youth in the region, including drug addiction and involvement in violence and petty crime. One wonders whether one of the sources of the violence might be an identity crisis among young men of the region resulting from the obliteration of Patani Malay identity over the last 100 years, resistance to the full adoption of a Thai identity (given its association with discrimination and oppression) and the attraction of a radicalized Islam to fill the void. The French scholar of Muslim society in Europe, Olivier Roy, argues that one of the reasons for extremism among some young European Muslims is their rejection of the traditional culture of their parents, their inability to find acceptance in the mainstream cultures of Europe, 47 and their refuge in a purified reconstruction of an 'imagined' Islam. 'The more radical the terrorists, the more they do not embody a traditional culture or a culture at all. Islamic radicalization is a consequence of "de-culturalization" and not the expression of a pristine culture.' 48 Roy's argument thus raises the question of whether a similar phenomenon of de-culturalization, albeit caused by different factors, may be a contributing factor to the radicalism in Thailand's south: 'The generation gap, coupled with a sense of disenfranchising [. . .] individualization of faith, self-teaching, generation gap, rejection of authority (including that of religious established leaders), loosening of family ties, lack of socialization with a broader community (including the ethnic community of their parents), and withdrawal 46 Personal communication from Abdulrazak Panaemalae, who is currently undertaking a research project on this issue. While the term 'Wahabi' has recently come into use, other terms used to indicate 'modernist' Islamic practice in the region include the Malay 'kaum muda', or in Thai, 'khana mai '. 47 In fact, these 'mainstream cultures' have themselves been undergoing a transition at the very moment of large-scale Muslim immigration, with the gradual weakening of the nation-states and the national identities they nurtured as a result of the project of European integration, and more generally, globalization. towards a small inward-looking group akin to a cult: all these factors show the extent of the process of deculturation of the radicals.'
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If a Patani Malay identity is indeed in crisis, then that may also explain why the separatist organizations such as PULO, the BRN and Bersatu, whose political ideologies were originally based, as argued above, on national liberation rather than Islam, seem only tangentially involved in the conflict that has erupted since the beginning of 2004. 50 Despite repeated claims by the government, it is quite unclear to what extent, if at all, separatism is a goal of the militants. Indeed, one of the puzzling aspects of the conflict is the ambiguity regarding the objectives of the militants, which is perhaps a symptom of the confused ideology of the movement in the midst of the void left by the obliteration of Patani Malay identity.
One of the most trenchant critiques of Patani Malay identity comes from a former militant, now a columnist writing in Thai for the national news magazine Nation Weekly under the pen-name, 'Bahrun'.
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Unlike most Thai academics whose target was the Thai government and its insensitive treatment of the local community, Bahrun's main target is the Malay nationalist ideology of the resistance movements in southern Thailand involved in the violence. To illustrate the deep roots of Malay nationalism in the region in one of his columns, he recalls his days as a student in a pondok in Patani, where his superiors would warn him never to trust the Muslim students from other provinces who could not speak Malay. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Muslims of the three southern provinces should see themselves as distinct from the rest of Thailand, a mindset that supports separatist sentiment. Bahrun sees exclusivist attitudes such as these as the legacy of values instilled by Patani's former traditional rulers. 52 He is particularly critical of academics (both Muslim and non-Muslim) for continually resorting to history, particularly 'Patani's glorious past', to explain the troubles in the south. He regards history as one of the main factors behind an enduring Malay chauvinism (khlang chat) that fuels militancy. 53 An even more serious charge he makes is that it is the influence of such radical Malay nationalism that has led to the distortion of Islamic teaching, seen for example in the controversial manual allegedly used by some of the militants, Berjihad di Patani:
The most important aspect about this mobilization of Muslim leaders and organizations is that they do not seem to realize that they are being ideologically led to create a distorted picture of Islam, caused by the force of the collision of Malay nationalism. This is one of the worst sins.' 55 In several of Bahrun's columns, one can see the influence of the Islamic discourse that rejects ethno-nationalism, the prominent theme in PAS's political discourse discussed above. Bahrun even refers explicitly to the well known commentary on the Qur'an by the Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb, in which this idea is developed. 56 The danger is in letting Islam become 'enchained' by Malay identity. 57 63 The Hikayat Patani itself, the key source for the history of Patani-Siamese relations before the eighteenth century, shows clearly that Patani was only intermittently free of Siamese political overlordship. 64 Moreover, the first sentence of the above paragraph, for which the ICG cites no evidence, also ignores the diversity and complexity of 'Muslim' and 'Malay' identity in southern Thailand, and fails to take into account those Muslims who do in fact identify themselves as 'Thai' and speak Thai as their first language. It also omits the hundreds of thousands of Muslims in southern Thailand who live outside the region mentioned who speak no Malay and have no relationship, sentimental or otherwise, with the former sultanate of Patani. The Thais appear in the report mainly in the form of oppressive state security officials, and the ethnic Chinese, whose presence on the peninsula is ancient and continuous, are invisible.
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This exclusionist conception of the 'Malay Muslims' of southern Thailand associated with a historically powerful Patani state, which is characteristic of Patani Malay nationalism, is central to the ideology of separatism. It can be seen, for example, in a map produced by the Bersatu separatist organization, which depicts the 'state' of Patani (Negara Patani) coloured in green, covering the entire region of southern Thailand. The existing provinces, whose present-day boundaries are 62 On how modern notions of national sovereignty disrupted pre-modern ideas of interstate relations based on vassal-overlord relations, see Thongchai Winichakul (1994) retained on the map, are renamed in Malay. 66 Underneath the map is the rallying cry, Bersatu, Berjuang, Merdeka -'Unity, struggle, freedom'. Bahrun refers to similar extravagant claims made by the BRN over the southern Thai peninsula stretching as far north as Kho Khot Kra district in Ranong province, on the basis that these lands once belonged to 'Melayu'. 67 The historical evidence for this claim would seem to be either the pre-Islamic state of Langkasuka, supposedly centred on the Patani region, or the larger 'Malay' empire of Sri Vijaya, which is believed to have extended as far north as Chaiya in Surat Thani province, near the northernmost point of the separatist group's claim. Thus we see a confused conflation of the notions of 'Malay', 'Islam' and 'Patani' within the framework of Patani Malay nationalist discourse.
Seen in this light, Thailand's policy of national integration in the south may be regarded as an attempt to exorcise this ghost. The official Thai concept of national identity has stood out from that of many of its South East Asian neighbours. Whereas Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, even Myanmar, have accepted the theory (if not always the practice) of dual identities, national and ethnic, since independence, Thailand maintains an essentially assimilationist model of national integration. It is revealing that one of the responses to the crisis in the south was to renew official nationalist campaigns to promote 'Thainess'. In the words of one of the most popular nationalist propaganda songs: 'underneath the Thai flag the whole population is Thai'. Fraser's study of 'Malay villagers' in the Patani region in the 1950s, caught between assimilationist Thai educational and cultural policies on the one hand and Malay separatist sentiment on the other, sums up their predicament nicely: '[. . .] The most readily available means of signifying his distinctiveness in the face of increasing contact with the Thais is the Malay villager's membership in the Islamic world community. He is unable to rally around linguistic differences, for these are under direct attack by the government. Although he insists he is first a Malay and then a Muslim, he is unable to use his Malay culture as a mark of distinctiveness, for either he is branded as an irredentist, or he is unable to define clearly what the distinctive elements of Malay culture are -other than religion. . .
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Unlike the Malays of the other states of the peninsula, the Patani Malays were unable to rally around another traditional source of belonging, their sultan, since the Patani sultanate had been abolished by Chulalongkorn at the beginning of the twentieth century -and in any case, the original sultanate had been divided up into seven districts with their own ruling houses early in the nineteenth century. Bereft of these markers of communal identity, it would appear natural that religion should take on an added significance. Fraser had already noticed the increasing role that religion was playing in the lives of Patani www.wtnsl.net, 10 December. A Malay version of the song, complete with Malay lyrics, is also available for the benefit of Malay-speaking Thai nationalists, produced by the Ratchaphat University of Yala and sung by the artists from the same university and the Public Relations Department (see Website: http:// www.thaisnews.com/prdnews/peace_song/song_south/song_1.html). men at the time of his writing. He finishes his study by noting an observation of the 'old men' in the village: '[. . .] the young men today are better than we were -they like to talk about religion and to go to makan pulot. They know that religion is good, especially in hard times.'
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Given the Thai government's policy of suppressing Patani Malay identity and assimilating the population as Thai Muslims on one side of the border, and Malaysian government programmes (implemented by UMNO nationally and PAS in neighbouring Kelantan) of Islamizing the Malays on the other, it is not surprising that the language of the resistance movements in the region has taken on an Islamist hue.
72 Yet since September 2001, and even more so since the outbreak of violence in the south in January 2004, this Islamic identity that the Thai state had sought to foster with increasing confidence until quite recently, has itself come under great suspicion, from the Thai government, other governments involved in pursuing the 'war on terror' and the international security studies community. Thus, the population of the 'three southern provinces' finds itself in what must be a difficult predicament, in which a Patani Malay identity is out of the question; adopting a mainstream Thai identity involves surmounting numerous cultural and religious obstacles; and embracing an Islamic identity, if expressed too overtly, places one at acute risk of being branded an 'Islamic extremist'.
It is tempting to conclude, therefore, that the radicalism that is a feature of the Islamic discourse of the militants in the southern border provinces today is a logical outcome of the denial of Patani Malay identity and the difficulty involved in fully accepting mainstream Thai identity. But in this Islamic discourse that circulates in southern Thailand, one can still sense the presence of the spectre of Patani Malay identity. 
